Parliament of Pakistan after the 18th Amendment: Institutional Transformation, Democratic Governance and Emerging Challenges

Abstract

This study examines the transformation of Parliament of Pakistan following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment of 2010, with particular emphasis on parliamentary supremacy, legislative autonomy, federalism, executive accountability, judicial relations, and democratic institutional development. Drawing on constitutional provisions and secondary scholarly and institutional sources, the study analyses how the amendment sought to reverse the centralizing tendencies associated with earlier constitutional interventions and restore the parliamentary character of the 1973 Constitution. The findings indicate that the removal of Article 58(2)(b), abolition of the Concurrent Legislative List, expansion of provincial autonomy, strengthening of parliamentary oversight, and reforms concerning judicial appointments and electoral institutions significantly altered the institutional balance between Parliament, the executive, and the provinces. The amendment also strengthened mechanisms of cooperative federalism through institutions such as the Council of Common Interests. However, implementation has remained constrained by political polarization, institutional capacity gaps, intergovernmental tensions, and limitations in parliamentary research and oversight. The study concludes that the Eighteenth Amendment represents a major civilian-led effort to consolidate parliamentary democracy and federalism, although its long-term effectiveness depends on sustained institutional capacity, constitutional adherence, and political commitment.