The Spatially Displaced Security Dilemma: Early Militarization and Crisis Stability across Indian Ocean Chokepoints
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.71317/jgst.2.11.2026.1040Keywords:
Security dilemma, Indian Ocean, chokepoints, crisis stability, Strait of Malacca, early militarization, India-China maritime rivalryAbstract
The security-dilemma literature usually assumes that rivals build up capabilities in the same place, so that each side’s deployments are visible to the other. This article argues that the assumption does not hold in the contemporary Indian Ocean, where states arm, garrison and survey chokepoints in peacetime, long before any crisis, and where rival capabilities often sit at different but functionally connected nodes of the same sea lines of communication. It introduces the spatially displaced security dilemma, a spiral of reciprocal insecurity in which rivals read each other’s build-up at distant nodes as relevant to their own security. It specifies three conditions, collocation, offense–defense distinguishability and transparency, that determine whether such a dilemma stays stable or becomes dangerous. A qualitative comparison traces early militarization at the Strait of Malacca and the Nine-Degree and Six-Degree Channels, with Hormuz as a contrasting collocated case. Displaced dilemmas prove crisis-stable while build-up is unilateral, incremental, public and distant from a rival’s forward forces, but this stability is conditional and can erode as basing matures. The article draws implications for regional confidence-building and for Pakistan.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Shiza Nasir, Dr. Muhammad Hatim, Muhammad Usman Shamim (Author)

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.











