



Muslim League and Mass Mobilisation: The Transformation of Emotions into Political Actions and the Making of Pakistan

Sami Ullah¹, Dr. Naumana Kiran²

¹ Lecturer, Government Graduate College Jalalpur Bhattian, Hafizabad; MPhil Scholar, Department of History and Pakistan Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

Email: sami.bhoon260@gmail.com

² Professor, Department of History and Pakistan Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
Submission: August 05, 2026 Revised: August 20, 2026 Accepted: September 09, 2026 Available Online: September 24, 2026 Keywords: Pakistan Movement, All-India Muslim League, Mass Mobilisation, Muslim Popular Emotions, Emotional History, Emotional Communities. Corresponding author: Sami Ullah Email: sami.bhoon260@gmail.com	This article analyses the way the All-India Muslim League capitalised on Muslims' popular emotions to muster mass support for the cause of Pakistan between 1940 and 1947. It maintains that the Muslim League was remarkably successful in linking Muslims' emotions and future aspirations with the demand for Pakistan, which helped the League transform shared emotions into organised political actions. By applying William M. Reddy's theoretical framework of 'emotives' and Barbara H. Rosenwein's idea of 'emotional communities', the article contends that human emotions such as fear, insecurity, humiliation, marginalisation, a sense of exclusion, anxiety, and hope were central and indispensable for the Muslim League to expand the horizon of its public support. The article employs a qualitative historical approach to examine notables' speeches, newspapers, pamphlets, and official records to underscore the interplay between emotions and political strategy. By putting Muslims' emotional outlook at the center of political mass mobilisation, this study presents a fresh perspective on the Pakistan Movement and a promising contribution to the growing scholarship on the history of emotions.

Introduction

After the failure of the 1857 war, subsequent political, economic, administrative, and constitutional developments, coupled with topsy-turvy Hindu-Muslim relations, shattered Muslims' previously stable emotional outlook. It created a chaotic emotional landscape, marked by political insecurity, humiliation, exclusion, marginalisation, and uncertainty about their communal future in British India. Muslims' experiences under the colonial set-up and fear of Hindu domination fostered Muslim nationalism that transcended regional, linguistic, and social diversity. In 1940, the demand for Pakistan had emerged not just as a constitutional proposal but as an emotional and political aspiration of a large segment of Muslim society in British India. This study explores how, in the emotionally charged environment, the All-India Muslim League, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, transformed Muslims' popular emotions into organised political mobilisation during the 1940s. The Muslim League relied on various influential sections of Muslim society and employed various strategies to transform emotions into political activism. The Muslim League engaged students, women, religious scholars, *pirs*, and *sajjada nashins* to popularise the movement among the ordinary Muslims. It used newspapers, pamphlets, election campaigns, public meetings, and grassroots organisations to propagate the demand for Pakistan by highlighting public emotions of insecurity, marginalisation, political vulnerability, and hope for a secure future. As a result, the Pakistan Movement evolved into a popular and mass movement in which the emotions of ordinary Muslims proved a powerful force behind political mobilisation.

Theoretical Framework

The present study lies in the domain of emotional history, which treats emotions as a force that shapes behaviour, constructs identities, and triggers historical change. Instead of considering emotions to be passive and dormant bodily sensations, this approach regards them as active drivers of historical change. Thus, it provides an effective framework for analysing how the All-India Muslim League mobilised Muslims in British India to attain its objective of a separate homeland in the subcontinent.

This article draws primarily on William M. Reddy's idea of emotives. He asserts that the expression of emotions is not merely a reflection of inner feelings and sensations but is also a discursive and performative activities that shape and transform emotions. Through slogans, speeches, newspapers, pamphlets, and public gatherings, political actors stir up, strengthen and redirect collective emotions. This approach is particularly useful for studying the League's political strategy as it wove together Muslims' predominant emotions like fear, insecurity, uncertainty, exclusion, marginalisation, hope, and collective pride to popularise the idea of Pakistan among ordinary Muslims from 1940 to 1947.

The study also utilises Barbara H. Rosenwein's framework of emotional communities. The idea denotes that groups share common emotional outlooks, such as values, norms, and modes of expression. Regardless of regional, linguistic, and social diversity, many Muslims in undivided India increasingly came to share an emotional disposition in response to political marginalisation, uncertainty and apprehensions related to the communal future, which helped them to emerge as an emotional community. The Muslim League effectively galvanised these collective emotions that constructed a sense of collective identity and communal solidarity that transcended parochial differences.

By joining Reddy's and Rosenwein's concepts, this article treats emotions not as outcomes of any external developments but as active agents in mass mobilisation. It claims that the League successfully articulated and channelled Muslims' popular emotions into organised political action, making emotions the primary drivers of mass mobilisation that ultimately culminated in the making of Pakistan.

Muslim League's Political Narrative and Emotional Foundation of the Movement

The period between 1940 and 1947 was the final phase in which Muslims' emotional trajectory, which had been evolving since 1857, reinforced throughout the late nineteenth century and in the early decades of the twentieth century, now reached the final stage. Muslim emotions had been shaped by the colonial governance policies, communal disputes, constitutional evolution, and, finally, the Muslims' experiences under the Congress Ministries (1937-39), between 1857 and 1940. By 1940, Muslims' accumulated grievances, anxieties, fears, insecurity, and hopes turned into a more organised and emotionally charged political direction.ⁱ The Muslim League, after learning the lesson from the failure of the 1937 provincial elections and ensuing Congress rule, under the spearheading of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, successfully fathomed these emotions and employed them rightly for the cause of Pakistan. The Muslim League sensationalised the emotions of insecurity, fear, marginalisation, and exclusion and inculcated in Muslims hopes for security, dignity, and a better future in the shape of Pakistan.

The Lahore Resolution of 1940 solidified the long-evolving Muslim emotional outlook by providing formal articulation to emotions that had been churning below the surface for decades. M.A Jinnah remarked at the presidential address at the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim League, March 1940, "*Musalman*s are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their State."ⁱⁱ Subsequently, Liaquat Ali Khan described Pakistan as an article of faith.ⁱⁱⁱ The occasion was not an abrupt event; instead, it was the formulation and consolidation of a long emotional trajectory in which shared communal feelings of vulnerability transformed into an organised and coherent demand for a separate country. Therefore, the Lahore Resolution was not just a political landmark but also an emotional focal point that unified Muslims by transforming scattered emotions into a collective and composed imagination of Pakistan. Furthermore, the Lahore Resolution provided the Muslims a blueprint for the next course of action to attain the ultimate purpose of a separate homeland. In this regard, Jinnah told Muslims that they could not achieve freedom by mere words and arguments; for this they should organise, sacrifice, and work selflessly.^{iv}

The decade's next important development was the Cripps Mission, which was sent by the British government to garner Indians' support in World War II in exchange for a constitutional package.^v For the Muslims, the Cripps Mission appeared to be an important episode in the trajectory of Muslim emotional evolution and their transformation into political mobilisation. The mission's constitutional proposal revealed the boundaries of British constitutional concessions and exacerbated Muslims' political anxieties as Muslims considered this proposal vague, delayed, and inadequate in protecting their rights. The Cripps Mission promised India Dominion Status as soon as the war was over, and permitted provinces the right of non-accession from the proposed Indian Union.^{vi}

However, the Muslim League found the offer inadequate because Pakistan was not clearly accepted and the right of option was given to provinces as a whole, not to Muslims separately.^{vii} Jinnah remarked that "so far as the Pakistan demand is not agreed to, we cannot agree any present adjustment which will in any way militate against the Pakistan demand."^{viii} This made the proposal appear unsatisfactory for Muslim political safeguards, who had a fresh memory of the excessiveness and atrocities of the Congress rule (1937-1939), viewed the Cripps proposal as unreliable constitutional safeguards in united India against the Hindu numerical edge.^{ix} This perceived betrayal and British complacency reinforced the League's emotional rhetoric of insecurity, fear, marginalisation, and political uncertainty. This allowed Muhammad Ali Jinnah to put it in a broader civilizational and political survival question. As a result, the disappointment generated by the Cripps proposal intensified collective resentment among the Muslims and crystallised the emotional foundations for mass mobilisation for the demand of Pakistan.

The leaders of the two communities conducted comprehensive talks in 1944 to resolve long-standing issues that persisted between them. The Jinnah-Gandhi negotiation took place in Bombay in September 1944. It was a crucial direct attempt at resolving issues between two communities in a united India, but they remained unsuccessful.^x This was an important event that brought the basic differences between the Muslim League and the Congress to the public. It was not just a constitutional debate but rather a test of Hindus as to whether they would accept Muslims' separate political identity and needs in a future united India. Jinnah insisted on the recognition of Muslims as a distinct nation deserving self-determination, which was opposite to Gandhi's commitment to a united India.

Jinnah also urged Gandhi to "face realities," meaning that Gandhi should accept the Lahore Resolution and the Muslim claim to nationhood as political facts.^{xi} The ultimate failure of the talks cemented Muslims' perception that Congress was not ready to adjust to Muslim political aspirations on conditions acceptable to the League. As a result, emotions of insecurity, exclusion, and mistrust that had been developed over previous decades were morphed into stronger support for Pakistan. The League presented this deadlock as proof that the Muslim community required an independent and separate political future, not any constitutional safeguards, in a Hindu-majority united India. Therefore, the collapse of the dialogue transformed emotional anxieties into political commitment for a separate homeland.

The Simla Conference was held in 1945 to resolve the long-standing issue of political representation and to restructure the Viceroy's executive council. The Simla Conference failed as the authorities did not accept Jinnah's insistence that all Muslim representatives should be taken from the Muslim League, as it was the sole representative of Indian Muslims.^{xii} The collapse of the Simla talks signified the mistrust and constitutional deadlock between Congress's claim to represent all Indians and the League's declaration of Muslims being the only party. This disagreement intensified communal polarisation and strengthened Muslims' belief that any dialogue in the united framework would inevitably yield drawbacks for the Muslim community. After the failure of the Simla Conference, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman praised Jinnah's stand as an act of political rescue for Indian Muslims. He wrote that Jinnah had saved the community from a "serious pitfall" and had steered its political ship to "safe anchorage." Khaliquzzaman also admired Jinnah's "grim determination" and "unflinching resolve," presenting his firmness at Simla as a defence of Muslim political interests.^{xiii} Therefore, the Simla talks happened to be a catalyst in altering political negotiations into emotional cementation that paved the way for mass mobilisation under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah for Pakistan.

The Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 was the final constitutional attempt at satisfying Muslims within a united India. Earlier, Muslims perceived the plan with optimism because it suggested three groups of provinces that were acceptable for Muslims, as it provided reliable safeguards for Muslim-majority regions without abandoning the probability of an All-India union.^{xiv} Afterwards, disagreements appeared about the interpretation of the provincial grouping scheme and the constitutional powers of the Assembly. It persuaded the leadership of the Muslim League that Muslim interests would not be fulfilled under centralised constitutional settings. This realisation had exerted deep repercussions on the Muslim emotional outlook. The failure of the Plan strengthened the long-standing fears of political subjugation from Hindu majoritarianism and reassured Muslims that any constitutional framework under a union would be insufficient to protect Muslim interests. The Muslim League utilised this disappointment and anxiety created by the Cabinet Mission Plan to build a strong emotional narrative focusing on security, dignity, and self-determination. In the broader horizon of the Pakistan movement, the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan amplified the transition from constitutional bargaining to mass mobilisation for a separate Muslim homeland in India.

Muslims of India observed a Direct-Action Day on 16 August 1946, after the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan to display their determination to gain a separate country in India.^{xv} The League called on Muslims to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan, defend their rights and honour, and resist both British slavery and future Hindu domination. It also called Muslims to stand behind the Muslim League and be ready for sacrifice.^{xvi} Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar portrayed Direct Action as a matter of honour and self-respect, not merely constitutional disagreement.^{xvii} The occasion was followed by the communal violence that profoundly

transformed the emotional landscape of the Pakistan Movement. Calcutta witnessed bloody communal violence in which thousands lost their lives.^{xviii} Punjab, Bengal, and Bihar also recorded various events of communal violence. These events of violence and atrocities turned theoretical constitutional issues into a question of physical threat and security and the very survival of the Muslim community in the united India under any circumstances. Owing to these events, communal relations went to the lowest point in the decade, and Muslims witnessed their long-standing fear, anger, and uncertainty. The Muslim League's claim that Muslims needed a separate homeland for their survival found more credibility due to this wave of communal violence. Consequently, the Direct-Action Day and ensuing communal violence created fear and uncertainty that intensified mass mobilisation and support for Pakistan in urban and rural areas. Thus, the events that transpired in 1946 marked a crucial final push to transform Muslims' popular emotions into organised political mobilisation.

The political and constitutional advancements that took place in the last phase of the Pakistan Movement hugely influenced Muslims' mindsets, as their emphasis shifted from constitutional demands to mass political struggle to achieve a separate country to secure their future. Jinnah remarked about this shift:

We have taken a most historic decision. Never before in the whole life-history of the Muslim League did we do anything except by constitutional methods and constitutional talks. We are to-day forced into this position by a move in which both the Congress and Britain have participated. We have been attacked on two fronts—the British front and the Hindu front. Today we have said good-bye to constitutions and constitutional methods. Throughout the painful negotiations, the two parties with whom we bargained held a pistol at us; one with power and machine-guns behind it, and the other with non-cooperation and the threat to launch mass civil disobedience. This situation must be met. We also have a pistol.^{xix}

This shift was embedded deep into Muslims' collective emotional outlook that had been evolving since the failure of the War of Independence in 1857. Although the Lahore Resolution furnished the Muslims with an unambiguous path, the debacles that followed, like the Cripps Mission Plan, the Jinnah-Gandhi Talks, the Cabinet Mission Plan, and the violence after Direct Action Day, not only further cemented Muslims' emotions of insecurity, exclusion, marginalisation, and political vulnerability but also altered these internally felt sensations into explicit, tangible political actions in the form of mass mobilisation. Simultaneously, these crises and a long trajectory of emotions provided a set stage for the Muslim League to capitalise on them to lead the Muslim masses to address these emotional concerns in the form of achieving a separate country, as all the other ways of constitutional compromises had failed to protect their interests. Similarly, these crises also strengthened feelings of hope, confidence, and communal unity, which glued the whole Muslim community together and also with the Muslim League throughout the struggle. Every failure of constitutional debate and leaders' talks exacerbated the emotional commitment of ordinary Muslims to the cause of Pakistan. With the passage of every day, Muslims' demand for Pakistan became stronger and more vehement, showing that human emotions and political developments operated in tandem to transform the emotions into structured political actions and ultimately caused a landmark event, as in the case of the creation of Pakistan.

Mobilising Emotions: Muslim League's Strategies of Mass Mobilisation

The transition of the All-India Muslim League's approach from elite politics to mass-based mobilisation played a crucial role in the making of Pakistan. This transformation occurred by utilising mobilisation strategies like effective use of print media, modern press (in the form of pamphlets, Pakistan Urdu literature series), impactful utilisation of public spaces and deployment of various social groups. In the process of transformation, the use of emotions was critical on various levels and forms. Various influential and vibrant factions, like students, women, and religious leaders of the Muslim society, helped the Muslim League to popularise its emotional narratives for political mobilisation by utilising various means like newspapers, pamphlets, rallies, and grassroots activism.^{xx} In this regard, uncertainty about their future under Hindu majoritarianism and permanent Hindu dominance, anxiety over political exclusion, the quest to preserve communal identity and culture, and hope for a better future were popularised, which produced a sense of unity among Muslims in India.

Print Media and Public Spaces as Channels of Emotional Mobilisation

The leadership of the Muslim League aptly employed communication channels to transform emotions into political action. The leadership effectively used print media to link political developments with the daily experiences of ordinary Muslims across India.^{xxi} Throughout the freedom Movement, the League had built a sophisticated and instrumental system of emotional mobilisation via newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed literature. These channels facilitated the League's leadership in disseminating and articulating themes of insecurity, exclusion, political vulnerability, communal unity, and hope to various factions of Muslim society. The League also turned abstract constitutional matters into coherent narratives that could be understood by

ordinary Muslims. Consequently, the demand for a separate country was perceived not just as a political proposal but as a collective solution to Muslim fears and aspirations.

After the Lahore Resolution in 1940, the Muslim press presented the creation of Pakistan as the panacea to Muslim emotional anxieties, political vulnerabilities and constitutional uncertainties. Through editorials, columns, and election coverage, the Muslim newspaper portrayed Pakistan for the Muslim community as a surety of political security, dignity, self-determination, and better protection of religious and cultural values. The Muslim press helped give Pakistan an Islamic and protective meaning. In this discourse, Pakistan was presented not merely as a territorial demand, but as a sovereign Islamic homeland, even a "New Medina," where Muslim political power, cultural thought, and religious identity could be preserved.^{xxii} Such an imaginative vision of Pakistan, not just a constitutional demand but also an emotionally appealing idea, was potentially capable of mobilising ordinary Muslims. Nehru, in his Lucknow speech, questioned what would happen to U.P. Muslims and their property if Pakistan was created. This speech produced an angry response from the Muslim League newspaper *Dawn*, in an editorial titled "Lucknow Hysterics."^{xxiii} The editorial argued that Nehru's remarks were a threat to Muslim property and security in Hindu-majority provinces, and that Muslims in minority areas would not be frightened away from supporting Pakistan. The press attached every day political development to themes of Muslim honour, security, and destiny; thereby, the press nourished emotional allegiance with the idea of Pakistan.

Notable newspapers, including *Dawn*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Zamindar*, *Inqilab*, *Jang*, *Manshoor*, and *The Star of India*, regularly published political developments from the League's perspective related to representation, constitutional safeguards, and communal betterment. Muhammad Ali Jinnah founded *Dawn* newspaper in 1941 and acknowledged the importance of the press as an essential instrument of political communication. Jinnah said that "The *Dawn* will mirror the views of Hindustan's Muslims and the All-India Muslim League."^{xxiv} *Dawn* used editorials such as "Never Again" to remind Muslim readers of their sufferings under Congress ministries during 1937-39 and to present the Muslim League as the only safeguard against a repetition of that experience.^{xxv} Furthermore, *Dawn*'s news report of November 2, 1945 presented Jinnah's election speech as part of the Muslim League's emotional political message. It reported Jinnah's claim that the elections would decide whether Indian Muslims stood for Pakistan or *Akhand Hindustan*, thus framing the election as a question of Muslim survival and political destiny.^{xxvi} These words manifest that the said newspaper was not just to share information with its readers but also a vehicle for formulating Muslim political aspirations and enhancing collective consciousness.

The *Dawn* always endorsed, through its coverage and commentaries, the Muslim League's narrative of being the only representative of Indian Muslims. *Dawn* endorsed the Muslim League's representative claim by weakening the credibility of rival Muslim groups. In its front-page story of October 13, 1945, *Dawn* described the Unionists as "Pawns in Non-Muslim Hands" and argued that "Muslim Interests Mean Nothing to Unionists."^{xxvii} This type of coverage presented non-League Muslim politics as unable to protect Muslim interests. It also strengthened the League's representative claim by presenting the 1945-46 elections as a direct test of Muslim support for Pakistan. Ian Talbot cites *Dawn*'s report of November 29, 1945, in which Jinnah declared: "Every vote in favour of the Muslim League candidates means Pakistan. Every vote against the Muslim League candidates means Hindu Raj."^{xxviii} This report made the League candidate appear as the representative of Pakistan itself, while opposition to the League was linked with Hindu domination. In this way, *Dawn* helped turn electoral support for the Muslim League into proof of Muslim allegiance to Pakistan. Thus, the press was not just a source of communication but was also an effective tool to transform emotional anxieties into political activism.

Besides *Dawn*, pamphlets and election literature in Urdu, as well as Urdu magazines, made the Muslim League's narrative available and comprehensible to the ordinary masses. Urdu newspapers such as *Daily Zamindar*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Inqilab*, etc. covered daily activities of students, women, mystics and other workers affiliated with the Muslim League and its cause of Pakistan. *Inqilab* linked Pakistan with Muslim political security and nationhood. One report declared that "there is no solution for Muslim India except Pakistan," while another rejected united nationalism as "artificial and self-deception" and called the Muslim demand for Pakistan "absolutely correct. It reported,

پاکستان کے سوا مسلم ہندوستان کا کوئی حل نہیں ہے^{xxix}

There is no solution for Muslim India except Pakistan.

Nawa-i-Waqt was an Urdu Muslim newspaper that was inaugurated in 1940. It was quite an influential and effective newspaper in popularising the political program of the Muslim League. The newspaper had played a significant role in turning Muslim emotions into collective political action. It was published in Urdu and directly asked Muslims for solidarity, ignited historical memories and hopes for political revival. In the election of 1946, the newspaper vehemently propagated the message of the Muslim League. On 19 January 1946, *Nawa-i-Waqt* urged Muslims to cast "every vote to the nominated candidates of the Muslim League and prove their

solidarity.^{xxx} Editorials, published in this paper, connected electoral politics of 1945-46 with the nostalgia of the grandeur of the Muslim rule in the subcontinent. The masses were assured that if the League gained political authority, "the sun of the glory of the Muslim government that had ruled India for 800 years" would rise again. Such a sentimental tone of the newspaper transformed electoral participation into an emotionally meaningful act of communal solidarity and historical revivalism. In editorials, the founder Hameed Nizami wrote extensively and related Muslim political dilemmas to survival. The October 1944 editorial discourse represented Muslim subordination under Hindu majoritarianism as tantamount to "erasing a whole civilisation from the face of the earth."^{xxxi} It gave wider coverage to students' and women's activities, including Pakistan conferences, celebration of Special days related to Muslims' past, rural propaganda activities for the spread of the idea of Pakistan among rural masses, election campaign and Civil Disobedience Movement. Through such a solid narrative disseminated through editorials and news coverage, *Nawa-i-Waqt* transformed apprehensions of political exclusion, pride in Muslim history, religious solidarity, and optimism for political revival into an emotionally charged rhetoric that led to the mass support for Pakistan.

Muslim League pamphlets explained the idea of Pakistan as the creation of a homeland for Indian Muslims where they would be able to protect their culture, exercise political authority, and spend their lives according to their religious ideals. During the 1945-1946 elections, League activists distributed pamphlets focusing on how the support for the League was tantamount to supporting Pakistan and safeguarding Muslim rights. Political literature and pamphlets played an important role in transforming constitutional debates into a popular understanding of Pakistan as a solution to Muslim political problems in colonial India, while also strengthening support for the Muslim League.^{xxxii}

The Pakistan Literature Series helped transform the constitutional debate into a clear public case for Pakistan. In the preface to *National States and National Minorities*, Jamiluddin Ahmad wrote that the pamphlets were meant to "dispel misconceptions" and explain the "viewpoint of the Muslim nation in India."^{xxxiii} The same pamphlet argued that minority safeguards had failed because minorities had been "oppressed and persecuted." In this way, pamphlet literature presented Pakistan as a necessary solution to Muslim political insecurity. Moreover, *The Economic Basis of Pakistan* made the Pakistan demand appear practical and workable. Anwar Iqbal Qureshi argued that "economically Pakistan had a very bright future" and that, because of its "strong, well-trained manpower and rich land," it would enjoy a "fairly high standard of living."^{xxxiv} This and other similar pamphlets helped remove doubts about Pakistan's viability and strengthened the Muslim League's claim that Pakistan was not only politically necessary but also economically possible.

Under a Committee of Writers associated with Aligarh, short pamphlets were issued in the Pakistan Literature Series to explain the League's position, defend the two-nation theory, and present Pakistan as a response to Muslim fears of political domination under a Congress-led or Hindu-majority system.^{xxxv} The All-India Muslim League formed a Committee of Writers under Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad of Aligarh, and pamphlets such as Kazi Saeed-ud-Din Ahmad's *The Communal Pattern of India* and Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad's *Some Aspects of Pakistan* were issued in the Pakistan Literature Series to explain the two-nation theory and the purpose of Pakistan.^{xxxvi} The Muslim Writers' Association at Aligarh also formed an Urdu Publication Committee and a Translation Committee to prepare League propaganda literature for free distribution among Muslim masses.^{xxxvii} This literature did not remain limited to educated readers. Students collected newspapers and Muslim League pamphlets in *mohallas* and read them aloud for people who could not buy or read newspapers.^{xxxviii} Urdu newspapers and public debates also helped spread the idea of Pakistan as a question of Muslim identity, insecurity, and political future. *Pakistan: The Heart of Asia* by Chaudhary Rahmat Ali was highly popular and effective among other political literature during the 1945-46 elections in the areas of Bengal, UP, and Punjab. This kind of literature used to attach the project of Pakistan with political security, religious and cultural protection, dignity, and saving Muslim distinct identity. These publications portrayed Pakistan not just as a constitutional arrangement, but rather as the fulfilment of Muslim aspirations for the future and an escape from historical emotional baggage.

Besides using the press, the Muslim League organised massive political campaigns and public meetings to transform Muslims' popular emotions of that time into collective political action. These public gatherings provided the Muslim League's leaders a platform to convey their narratives to the ordinary Muslims that helped in interpreting political developments in emotionally meaningful ways. Jinnah's speeches linked constitutional debates with broader issues regarding dignity, security, and Muslim nationhood. Jinnah, while arguing about separate Muslim nationhood, said that the Hindu-Muslim issue was not only a minority question, but a question of two separate nations: "*Mussalmans* are not a minority. *Mussalmans* are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their State."^{xxxix} Furthermore, Jinnah's remarks showed how he linked constitutional negotiations with Muslim insecurity: "Never before in the whole life-history of the Muslim League did we do anything except by constitutional methods and constitutional talks... We have been attacked on two fronts—the British front and the Hindu front. Today we have said good-bye to constitutions and constitutional methods."^{xl}

Muslim student conferences became an important means of popularising the Pakistan demand among ordinary Muslims. These gatherings spread awareness of Muslim nationalism, strengthened public faith in Jinnah's leadership, and helped translate the constitutional idea of Pakistan into an emotionally meaningful mass cause.^{xli} Public meetings were not just political events but were also spaces where popular emotions were expressed, strengthened, and found ways to convert into solid political actions towards the cause of Pakistan under the leadership of the Muslim League. The Muslim League harbingered a sense of collective purpose in the Muslim community via fiery speeches, slogans, poetry, banners, and public involvement.

The emotional fervour of these campaigns was evident during the 1945-46 elections. After the failure of the Jinnah-Gandhi talks and other constitutional attempts, the leadership of the Muslim League became more vocal and assertive and started appealing to the Muslim masses for communal unity and determination for a separate country in India. At a meeting of the All-India Muslim League Council in 1946, Jinnah firmly declared: "This day we bid good-bye to constitutional methods."^{xlii} These words of Jinnah illustrated the frustration and emotional intensity caused by the constitutional failure and deadlocks. In this backdrop, public gatherings appeared as critical platforms for the need, unity, and communal resolve for achieving the goal of Pakistan. The Muslim League conducted large rallies and mass processions in Punjab, Bengal, Sindh, and the United Provinces, and other areas, in which support for Pakistan was attached to the safeguarding of Muslim culture, religion, distinct communal identity, and future security and betterment.

During the 1945-46 campaign, people from all walks of Muslim society, like women, students, traders, ulema, and local activists, were vibrantly and passionately engaged in preparing for public meetings, distributing literature, and trying to garner mass support for League candidates. Students showed sheer activism in the 1945-46 election campaign. The Punjab Muslim Students Federation opened an Election Board and Islamia College Election Directorate. It wrote to Muslim League candidates, asked how many volunteers they needed, and sent trained student batches to different constituencies. These students visited villages, streets, and homes, distributed Muslim League literature, explained Jinnah's aims, delivered speeches, and persuaded people to vote for League candidates.^{xliii} Women also worked practically in the election campaign. Girl students and women workers organised *mohalla* meetings, held female gatherings in streets and bazaars, sang Pakistan and Muslim League anthems, and urged women to vote for the League. Muslim women workers and girl students reached female voters in both urban and rural areas because male workers could not easily enter women's spaces in a segregated society. Their regular canvassing helped turn women voters toward the League.^{xliiv} Traders, businessmen, bankers, and commercial groups also became part of the League's wider support base. By the mid-1940s, the League no longer represented only nawabs and landed elites, but also merchant-industrialists, traders, bankers, professionals, and urban middle classes. Jinnah urged Muslim commercial classes to organise themselves through the All-India Federation of Muslim Chambers of Commerce and to support Muslim economic development. This commercial support, including financial support for League funds and election activity, helped strengthen the League's campaign machinery.^{xliv} Besides the middle class, the Muslim League targeted low-income groups of the society and included slogans for their economic betterment in the future Muslim country.

Such a political communication, like the organised circulation of the Muslim League's message through newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, public meetings, study circles, and local activists, targeting the lower strata of society proved emotionally effective because it connected present and everyday political developments with deeply embedded popular emotions. The literature's language portrayed Pakistan as a "New Medina"; that expression showed Muslims' religious and historical attachment. Such figurative language made Pakistan's demands popular among the masses, not as an elite political program but as an emotional need of ordinary Muslims. Through these channels of publication, the Muslim League transformed fears of exclusion and marginalisation and hope for a safe and protected future into mass mobilisation for Pakistan.

In this context, William M. Reddy's theoretical framework, "emotives," is quite pertinent for interpreting the Muslim League's strategy of connecting with common Muslims. Reddy's concept depicts how the expression of certain emotions affects political behaviour. The Muslim League's communication channels, like newspapers, pamphlets, election literature, speeches, and slogans, not only conveyed political messages but also organised and exacerbated emotions of insecurity, exclusion, political marginalisation, communal pride, solidarity, dignity, and hope. The Muslim press *Dawn*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, and *Inqilab* related day-to-day political happenings with Muslims' everyday concerns, while notables' speeches and writings presented Pakistan as a panacea to Muslims' social, political, and economic problems in the united India. Wording like "Every vote in favour of the Muslim League means Pakistan" and framing Pakistan as a solution to Muslim insecurity made electoral participation an emotionally meaningful act. In this way, the League's political communication worked as emotives. It not only talked about Muslims' existing emotional outlook but also organised, intensified, and led them to the political cause of Pakistan. Another concept devised by H. Rosenwein's framework of "emotional communities" is also relevant to understanding how these articulated emotions turned into a collective

outlook of the Muslim community in united India. Public gatherings, student organisations, women's networks, religious figures, local activists, election campaigns, newspapers, and pamphlets produced spaces that helped circulate emotional messages and gave them emotional meanings. Women conducting meetings with female voters, religious notables mobilising their adherents, students visiting villages, and local League leaders organising campaigns prepared various social groups to engage in a shared emotional and political discourse. Therefore, emotions like insecurity, pride, solidarity, marginalisation, exclusion, and hope were popularised and became Muslims' broader collective emotional outlook. The 1945-46 elections showed the success of this process in which the emotional rhetoric was conveyed through print and public gatherings, resulting in an organised political outcome in favour of the Muslim League. The Pakistan Movement can be viewed not just as an elite and constitutional struggle but as a historical trajectory in which emotions were organised through emotives, disseminated among emotional communities, and ultimately morphed into a collective political action.

Social Groups and Mobilisation of Popular Emotions for Pakistan

The Muslim League deployed various social groups, including students and women in the first stage and then mystics and low-income groups of the society in the later stage, to alter Muslims' popular emotions into a structured political mobilisation for Pakistan. All these groups used existing emotions of common Muslims successfully and prepared them for the final round of the Pakistan movement.

Muslim students were the most reliable and productive agents in this regard. The Punjab Muslim Students Federation (PMSF) came into being in 1937, and it played a role in the preparation of the Lahore Session of the Muslim League in March 1940, in which the Pakistan Resolution was adopted.^{xlvi} After this, Muhammad Ali Jinnah heavily relied on students and motivated them to become trailblazers of Muslim political activism. Quaid-i-Azam came to Lahore in 1944 and, while addressing the students of Islamia College, said:

You know that I am fighting the battle for Pakistan with the army of young students. You are my hands and arms. At present, the youth of Punjab have a great responsibility on their shoulders. You have to create among the Muslims the realisation that we want to establish Pakistan because we are a separate nation. The Hindus and the British are fully aware of this fact, yet they deliberately deny this reality. But that is not the real issue. Our real difficulty is that there are still some people among us who do not fully realise that we are a separate nation. As soon as we succeed in convincing such people of this fact, God willing, Pakistan will be established. Quaid-i-Azam said that this task would have to be accomplished by you, the youth, because students have no personal interests. Their struggle is based on sincerity, and therefore the public will greatly appreciate it. Therefore, my advice to you is to remain prepared and, when the time comes, work wholeheartedly for this mission.^{xlvii}

The PMSF organised the First Pakistan Conference in Lahore in March 1941. Muhammad Ali famously said, "Today is the 1st of March; my advice to you is march on."^{xlviii} Motivated by these words, several Pakistan Conferences in Lyallpur (1941), Rawalpindi, Multan, and Jullundur (1941), subsequently Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi, and Amritsar (1944), were organised by the students.^{xlix} These conferences accelerated the popularity and acceptance of the demand for Pakistan among ordinary masses and aligned political vision with Muslims' popular emotions of insecurity, exclusion, marginalisation, pride, and hope. Therefore, students were not just supporters of the Pakistan Movement but also facilitators who fetched the Muslim League's emotional narratives from elite gatherings to the common Muslim masses.

Students played a critical role in the expansion of the movement via rural campaigns, study circles, journals, booklets, Pakistan libraries, League Weeks, handbills, and public readings of newspapers and League literature in streets and localities.¹ Students organised study circles in educational institutions and established a "Pakistan Library" in Lahore to make political literature easily accessible to the common masses. In various urban areas, students collected newspapers like *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Shahbaz*, and *Ihsan* and read them publicly in front of the ordinary masses. Moreover, to strengthen Muslim historical awareness and communal bonding, students started celebrating Pakistan Day, Iqbal Day, and Tipu Sultan Day.ⁱⁱ During the 1945-46 elections, students voluntarily served in various constituencies to campaign for League candidates, and this proved very helpful in the League's overall electoral success. The students of Islamia College launched a highly organised campaign to win the elections. An election cell was established in the college under the supervision of the well-known student leader of the time, Syed Qasim Rizvi.ⁱⁱⁱ At this cell, students were divided into different groups and trained in canvassing in support of the Muslim League. As part of this campaign, trained students were sent to various constituencies to persuade the public to vote for the Muslim League and to provide them with information about the creation of Pakistan. In this connection, the services of Abdul Rahman were utilised in Montgomery, while Asad Hussain Shah, a student leader of the time, was sent to the Shakargarh constituency, which was considered highly dangerous. In *Shakargarh*, he faced serious risks, including the possibility of assassination attempts, and opponents of the Muslim League looked upon him

with hostility. Despite these dangers, the students continued their efforts during the 1945–46 elections, persuading people to support the Muslim League and vote for its candidates.

In the Civil Disobedience Movement, students marched, protested, and organised strong and huge processions and demonstrations all around the country. For this purpose, on 10 February 1947, students massively protested, which halted large parts of the city and led to an almost shutdown situation.^{liii} These strong and effective students' activities turned Muslims' emotions of insecurity and uncertainty about the future into well-organised political mobilisation, thereby playing a critical role in popularising the idea of Pakistan among common Muslims.

Women were also engaged particularly in the 1940s by the Muslim League to materialise its goal of achieving Pakistan. Women's engagement in this project was not just effective in propagating the Muslim League's agenda but also provided the Pakistan Movement a positive and striking dimension, as now the Pakistan Movement had penetrated the spaces that were previously unexplored and underutilised. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Pakistan Movement, took particular interest in engaging educated women for the cause and motivated them to come forward to propagate political consciousness among other women. In this regard, Fatima Begum was a notable personality to whom Jinnah gave the task of educating women and making them acquainted with the League and its agenda of Pakistan.^{liv} For this purpose, she started an institution named Jinnah Islamia Girls College at *Nawan Kot*, which was inaugurated by Jinnah himself in 1937.^{lv} Subsequently, the college proved to be the hub of women's political training and Pakistan Movement's activities.^{lvi} At the same time, other women's organisations like the All-India Muslim Women League, the Muslim Girls National Guard, and the Muslim Girls Students Federation provided organisational platforms to ordinary women to participate in public life in general, and in the Pakistan Movement in particular. These endeavours turned Muslim women from passive observers to active participants in the Pakistan Movement struggle.

Women played a critical role during the Lahore Resolution and the election campaigns of 1945–46. Under the leadership of Lady Abdul Qadir, the Muslim Women League created a Women's Reception Committee to take care of female delegates coming for the Lahore Session. Students of Jinnah Islamia Girls College were very active as volunteers during the session. Well-known Muslim women like Begum Shahnawaz, Saeeda Waheed, and Amjadi Bano delivered speeches and mobilised support for the League. Jinnah remarked that "If political consciousness is awakened among our women, your children will not have much to worry".^{lvii} Women actively played their role in the 1945–46 elections by organising meetings, canvassing voters, getting support for the League's candidates by visiting their respective constituencies, and arranging transport to polling stations in order to secure support for the Muslim League.^{lviii} A student activist, Khalida Muniruddin Chughtai, describing her practical work during the Pakistan Movement, recalled that they would take bread from home, pack it into a small bundle, and often go together with Miss Siddiqui. Sometimes, an elderly peon from their college would take them on his bicycle and drop them off. On reaching their destination, Begum Chughtai became silent, and her emotions began to show through her eyes. Dr Chughtai was also visibly moved. Finally, we broke the silence and asked, "Madam, are you remembering that sincere old peon?" "Yes," she replied in an emotional voice. She regretted that she could not even remember the name of that unknown freedom fighter. He would often carry bread and onions or pickles with him, and whenever they felt hungry, he would give them his own provisions. She remarked, "What kind of people there were who played their silent role in this struggle." She then resumed her recollection with the same enthusiasm.

She continued that sometimes they travelled by *tonga*, paying two *annas* each, and got off at Delhi Gate. From there, they went into the inner city and knocked on the doors of different houses. When a woman came outside, they would say, "Auntie, please let us come inside." She would ask, "Who are you, and where have you come from?" They would reply, "Please let us come inside; then we will tell you." If a man opened the door, however, they would not enter. Going from house to house, they gradually conveyed their message to the women. At first, the women often argued with them, which, Khalida recalled, reflected the low level of education at that time. Some would ask, "Who is Mr Jinnah? We do not know any Jinnah." The activists then explained that there were two nations in India, Hindus and Muslims, and asked whether they wanted Hindus to rule over them. The women would respond that they did not want such rule and asked why Hindus should govern them. The activists would then explain that Muslims would govern themselves once they had their own country. They sometimes visited the same household three or four times so that the message they had taught would become firmly established. Reflecting on this work, Khalida Muniruddin Chughtai stated with conviction that if girls and women had not undertaken this work, the establishment of Pakistan might have been considerably delayed.^{lix}

They proved themselves in the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1947. In 1947, women organised a massive protest against the government atrocities.^{lx} The protesters met with harsh responses from the administration as they used tear gas, arrests, and baton charges to disperse the agitators, but women stood firm against this repression. These events proved women's role in transforming

communal attachment to identity and Pakistan into direct political mobilisation. By this, women extended the support base of the Pakistan Movement and substantiated the League's claim to be representative of the collective aspirations of Muslims of India.

The Muslim League targeted peasants and workers to muster popular support for the Pakistan Movement because these sections were more emotionally charged and prepared for the mobilisation. The mobilisation of peasants and ordinary workers in Pakistan signified the inclusivity and popularity of the Pakistan movement beyond the educated elite to the general masses. By the 1940s, the peasants and workers had come to the realisation that the Muslim League was working in line with the protection of their communal interests and a better political future. In the 1945-46 elections, the majority of the peasant voters resisted the influence of landlords and notables and cast votes in favour of the League's candidates. In rural areas, villagers formed reception committees for the League's leaders, involved in political meetings, and helped financially to run the campaigns despite limited resources. Peasants' support was important and critical; the rural areas were heavily dominated by local patronage networks. Peasants' readiness to shun established shackles of political affiliations and support for the League showed that the demand for Pakistan was gaining currency among ordinary Muslims of India. Emotions of communal bond, political marginalisation, socio-economic insecurity, and hope for a secure and stable future with religious freedom motivated the rural Muslims to join hands with the League and support it in its struggle for Pakistan.

The participation of workers was evident, particularly in the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1947. Various occupational unions, such as the *Tongawalla* union and the *Tanor Wala* union, actively engaged in strikes and joined the League's called processions and agitations against the government.^{lxi} Traders, transport workers, artisans, and daily wage earners were vibrantly involved in processions, rallies, and public meetings in the Pakistan Movement under the leadership of the Muslim League. The participation of these segments of society was important as they had stakes and interests in constitutional debates and still voluntarily joined the Pakistan Movement. During demonstrations in Lahore, workers were quite helpful in sustaining agitation activities through strikes, financial support, and participation in rallies. The participation of these groups showed that the League had effectively transformed Muslims' popular emotions of insecurity, marginalisation, exclusion, and solidarity into practical political actions. Their activities also proved that the demand for Pakistan was not an elite project; rather, it was a mass demand.

Besides ordinary masses, the Muslim League also engaged pirs and *sajjada nashins* for the Pakistan Movement. The backing of pirs and *sajjada nashins* was instrumental in widening the influence of the Muslim League because they wielded immense spiritual authority in rural areas. Previously, many of the *pirs* had favoured the Unionist Party, but with changes in the political situation after 1940, they shifted their tilt toward the Muslim League.^{lxii} In this time period, influential religious leaders came to the conclusion that the Muslim League's idea of Pakistan would ultimately create a homeland where Muslims' religious and cultural traditions would be protected.^{lxiii} After the collapse of the *Simla* Conference in 1945, Jinnah tried to utilise the influence of religious figures to enhance the League's support in rural areas. Consequently, custodians of several shrines and religious leaders joined the Muslim League, including the pirs and *sajjada nashins* of *Jalalpur*, *Shah Jiwana*, *Multan*, and *Jehaniyan*.^{lxiv} These religious leaders took the task of spreading the Muslim League's message very seriously and tried their best to fulfil it. For instance, Khawaja Muhammad Qamar ud Din Siyalvi tasked his student Hakim Atta Muhammad Shah to propagate the League's message of Pakistan in the areas of Mianwali and its surroundings; the areas were strongholds of the Unionist Party.^{lxv} Their activities showed how religious authority became an effective channel for political mobilisation.

Pir and *sajjada nashins* not only symbolically endorsed the Muslim League's narratives but also practically contributed to the Pakistan Movement. They established educational institutions, organised gatherings, founded political and religious organisations, published journals, and actively campaigned for the Muslim League.^{lxvi} Pir Muhammad Fazal of Jalalpur started *Hizbullah*, and *Ihya-i-Islam* was founded by Shah Maghfur ul-Qadri to spread the Muslim League's objectives in far-flung areas. Maulana Ahmad-ud-Din Gangvi started a madrassah in Mianwali that trained students to work for the Pakistan Movement. Moreover, Maulana Karam-ud-Din worked as an editor for *Siraj-ul-Akhbar*, and Hafiz Khuda Bakhsh founded the *Yad-i-Khuda* from Chiniot. These two publications both endorsed the League's Pakistan cause.^{lxvii}

While campaigning in the 1945-46 elections, several pirs visited constituencies across Punjab, including Sargodha, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Mianwali, Multan, and Bahawalpur, asking their devotees to vote for the Muslim League. In the areas of the influence of the Tiwana family, Khawaja Qamar Siyalvi and his followers made tours in favour of the League's candidates. By employing their religious authority, various religious leaders issued fatwas in favour of the Muslim League and its cause of Pakistan and made it obligatory for Muslims to support it. The Muslim press, particularly *Dawn* and *Nawa-i-Waqt*, circulated these pronouncements. In this context, the verdict of Pir Jama'at Ali Shah was that the Muslims should participate in the Pakistan Movement; otherwise, those refusing to vote for the Muslim League should not get communal recognition. He said, 'I have issued a verdict neither to pray funeral nor bury such Muslims in the Muslims graveyard who will not vote for the Muslim League.'^{lxviii} Furthermore, Pir Jama'at

Ali Shah announced at a Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam conference held in Islamia College Lahore that the Pakistan Movement represented a tussle between "right and wrong" and asked Muslims to support the League in this struggle.^{lxix} Such words from a prominent religious figure gave religious legitimacy to the demand for Pakistan and mobilised large segments of society for this cause. Muslim mystics widely used religious emotions of common Muslims for the cause of Pakistan. By utilising their sources of influence like disciples, *fatwas*, publications, shrine affiliations, and practical election campaigns, pirs and *sajjada nashins* changed communal popular emotions into political mobilisation and proved instrumental for public mass activism in the last years of the Pakistan Movement.

By applying William M Reddy's theoretical framework of emotives, the Muslim League's mobilisation of students, women, peasants, workers, pirs and *sajjada nashins* can be explained. These social factions not just expressed existing emotions but also organised, intensified, and directed them towards political action. Students turned the masses' emotions of insecurity, belonging, marginalisation, pride, and hope into political activism by means of study circles, conferences, newspapers, public readings, Pakistan libraries, and election campaigns. Women also played a critical role in carrying the same emotional narratives into domestic and female social spaces through meetings, political agitations, and canvassing. Workers and peasants turned their apprehensions of marginalisation, socioeconomic insecurity, and political representation into political and collective action. Pirs and *Sajjada Nashins* legitimated these emotions by representing support for Pakistan as a religious and collective responsibility. Therefore, the activism of these social groups shows the operation of emotives at the grassroots level: popular Muslim emotions were organised and strengthened through political, social, and religious language and later transformed into political practices like voting, campaigning, and protests. The League was successful not just in mobilising the existing emotional reservoir but also in providing these groups with a medium by which those emotions could be expressed, exacerbated and transformed into political behaviour.

Similarly, this process of transformation is related to Barbara H. Rosenwein's framework of emotional communities. Various groups involved in the struggle for Pakistan had distinct social statuses and had different interests, but the League's platform provided the organisational networks to engage in an increasingly collective emotional and political culture. Women, students, peasants, workers, and religious figures propagated mutual emotions of Muslim identity, insecurity, dignity, pride, and hope for a safe and secure future via newspapers, conferences, literature, meetings, religious networks, campaigns, and public agitations. The presence of the general masses shows that the emotional appeal was not just restricted to the educated elite and became popular within multiple social communities. In this context, the struggle for Pakistan can be viewed as a process of emotional community formation, in which fragmented social strata developed a collective objective of the demand for Pakistan. The electoral mobilisation of 1945-46 and the mass activism of 1947 thus marked the culmination of a process in which emotions were expressed and articulated by Reddy's emotives, proliferated and reinforced in Rosenwein's emotional communities, and eventually became organised political activism for the establishment of Pakistan.

The establishment of Pakistan marked the zenith of a prolonged historical process in which Muslims' popular emotions, created and reinforced by decades of communal experiences, constitutional developments, the British governance model, and collective mobilisation, finally got territorial and constitutional expression. The creation of Pakistan was not only the end of British colonialism but also the manifestation of a project that had united various sections of Muslim society regardless of their differences under a shared purpose. In this context, Pakistan appeared as the final result of a historical trajectory through which Muslim collective and popular emotions were articulated, presented, and ultimately transformed into sovereign statehood.

Conclusion

The study shows that the Muslim League played an important role in transforming Muslim emotions into political action during the final phase of the Pakistan Movement. Through speeches, newspapers, pamphlets, public meetings and election campaigns, the League connected feelings of political insecurity, communal identity, dignity and hope with the demand for Pakistan. These emotions were further strengthened through the participation of students, women, religious leaders, pirs, local activists and other sections of Muslim society.

The 1945-46 elections were particularly important in this process, as emotional appeals were translated into practical political activities such as canvassing, public meetings, door-to-door campaigns and voting. The League therefore did not rely only on its central leadership but developed a network through which the message of Pakistan reached wider sections of society. In this way, emotional identification with the Pakistan demand contributed to the creation of a sense of collective Muslim political identity.

Thus, the making of Pakistan was not only a constitutional or political process but also involved the mobilisation of emotions. The Muslim League successfully connected existing feelings and aspirations with a political program and helped transform them into collective political action. This emotional dimension provides an important perspective for understanding the nature and success of mass mobilisation during the Pakistan Movement, which accelerated the process of Pakistan's creation.

End Notes

- ⁱ See especially Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of the Pakistan Movement*, 3rd rev. and expanded ed. (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2016), 35-59.
- ⁱⁱ K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), 164-65.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906-1947*, Vol. 2, 1924-1947 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2007), 346.
- ^{iv} *Ibid.*, 310-11.
- ^v Bipan Chandra et al., *India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1989), 679-80.
- ^{vi} *Ibid.*, 679-80.
- ^{vii} Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 37.
- ^{viii} Hayat, *Aspects of the Pakistan Movement*, 29.
- ^{ix} Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906-1947*, vol. 2, 1924-1947, 403-404.
- ^x Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, 164-65.
- ^{xi} Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 235.
- ^{xii} Lionel Knight, *Britain in India, 1858-1947* (London: Anthem Press, 2012), 147-48.
- ^{xiii} Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 136.
- ^{xiv} Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 248-49;
- ^{xv} *Ibid.*, 249.
- ^{xvi} Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. 2, 522-23.
- ^{xvii} *Ibid.*, 533-23.
- ^{xviii} Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, 40-41.
- ^{xix} Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906-1947*, Vol. 2, 1924-1947, 524-25.
- ^{xx} For a detailed study on this, please see Naumana Kiran Imran, *People's Role in Struggle for Pakistan 1940-1947* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2021).
- ^{xxi} For a detailed study on this, please see Naumana Kiran, "Punjab Muslim Students Federation and Pakistan Movement," *Pakistan Perspectives* 18, no. 2 (July-December 2013); Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- ^{xxii} Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam...*, 4-5 and 217.
- ^{xxiii} "Lucknow Hysterics," *Dawn* (Delhi), October 7, 1945, cited in Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, 459-60.
- ^{xxiv} Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, 151.
- ^{xxv} *Dawn* (Delhi), November 2, 1945, cited in Roger D. Long, "Dawn Delhi IV: The Making of Pakistan," *Dawn*, September 26, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1360167>.
- ^{xxvi} Muhammad Ali Jinnah, speech at the Muslim League election campaign meeting, Bombay, reported in *Dawn* (Delhi), November 2, 1945, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1360167>.
- ^{xxvii} "Muslim Interests Mean Nothing to Unionists," *Dawn* (Delhi), October 13, 1945, cited in Roger D. Long, "Dawn Delhi IV: The Making of Pakistan," *Dawn*, September 26, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1360167>.
- ^{xxviii} *Dawn* (Delhi), November 29, 1945, cited in Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998), 85.
- ^{xxix} *Inqilab* (Lahore), December 13, 1945.
- ^{xxx} *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), January 19, 1946.
- ^{xxxi} Hameed Nizami, editorial, *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), October 5, 1944.
- ^{xxxii} Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, 398-400.
- ^{xxxiii} Jamiluddin Ahmad, preface to Muhammad Abdul Sattar Kheiri, *National States and National Minorities*, Pakistan Literature Series No. 1 (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1945), quoted in Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, 401.
- ^{xxxiv} Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, *The Economic Basis of Pakistan*, Pakistan Literature Series No. 12 (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), 19 cited in Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, 422.
- ^{xxxv} Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965), 139.
- ^{xxxvi} *Ibid.*, 139-40.
- ^{xxxvii} Long, "Dawn Delhi IV: The Making of Pakistan," *Dawn*, September 26, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1360167>.
- ^{xxxviii} Kiran, "Punjab Muslim Students Federation and Pakistan Movement," 65-67.

- ^{xxxix} Muhammad Ali Jinnah, presidential address to the Twenty-Seventh Session of the All-India Muslim League, Lahore, March 1940, in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906–1947*, vol. 2, 1924–1947 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2007), 310–11.
- ^{xl} Muhammad Ali Jinnah, concluding remarks at the All-India Muslim League Council Meeting, Bombay, July 1946, in Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, 2:525.
- ^{xli} Kiran, “Punjab Muslim Students Federation and Pakistan Movement, 56–63.
- ^{xlii} Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan*, 524-25.
- ^{xliii} Naumana Kiran Imran, “Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mass Mobilization: A Case Study of Punjab,” *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society (Historicus)*, vol. 71, no. 3 (2023): 62–64.
- ^{xliv} Naumana Kiran, “Political Awareness among Women in the Punjab: A Case Study of their Role in the Pakistan Movement,” *Pakistan Journal of Women Studies Alam e Niswan* vol 20, no.2 (2013): 62-64.
- ^{xl} Hayat, *Aspects of Pakistan*, 186, 209 and 211.
- ^{xli} Imran, “Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mass Mobilization, 58.
- ^{xlii} Bidar Malik, *Yaran-e-Maktab, Jild Doum: Hasool-i-Pakistan ki Jiddo-Juhd Aaini Shahadatein* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, Punjab University, Quaid-i-Azam Campus), 35–36.
- ^{xliii} Imran, “Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mass Mobilization, 58.
- ^{xliiv} Kiran, “Punjab Muslim Students Federation and Pakistan Movement, 56–63.
- ^l Dharamvir Bhardwaj, “The Role of Punjab Muslim Students Federation in South-East Punjab,” *International Journal of Education, Modern Management, Applied Science & Social Science* 2, no. 2 (April–June 2020): 214–15.
- ^{li} Imran, *People’s Role in Struggle for Pakistan*, 26-27.
- ^{lii} Malik, *Yaran-Maktab, Jild Doum*, 41, 48 and 49.
- ^{liii} Mirza, *The Punjab Muslim Students Federation*, 374-75.
- ^{liv} Naumana Kiran, “Fatima Begum: A Narrative of Unsung Hero of Pakistan Movement,” *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 54, no. 2 (December 2017): 269-70.
- ^{lv} *Ibid.*, 269-70.
- ^{lvi} *Ibid.*, 270.
- ^{lvii} Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan*, 320.
- ^{lviii} Kiran, “Political Awareness among Women in the Punjab, 62-64.
- ^{lix} Malik, *Yaran-Maktab, Jild Doum*, 113, 14.
- ^{lx} Kiran, *Fatima Begum: A Narrative of Unsung Hero of Pakistan Movement*, 272-73.
- ^{lxi} Naumana Kiran, “Role of the Marginalized Groups of Punjab in Pakistan Movement, 1940-1947,” *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol. XXXVI, No.1 (2015): 138
- ^{lxii} David Gilmartin, “Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab,” *Modern Asian Studies* 13, no. 3 (July 1979): 504, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X00007228>.
- ^{lxiii} *Ibid.*, 508-9.
- ^{lxiv} Naumana Kiran, “Muslim Mystics of the Punjab and the Pakistan Movement,” *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, Vol. 67 No.1/2 (Jan-June 2019):
- ^{lxv} Muhammad Siddique Kasuri, *Karwan-i-Tehrik-i-Pakistan*, cited in Imran, “Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mass Mobilization: A Case Study of Punjab, 69.
- ^{lxvi} *Ibid.*, 67-73.
- ^{lxvii} *Ibid.*, 70.
- ^{lxviii} Kasuri, *Jehan-i-Amiri-i-Millat* cited in Imran, “Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 71.
- ^{lxix} Aftab Ahmad Qureshi, *Karwan-i-Shauq*, cited in Naumana Kiran Imran, “Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mass Mobilization: A Case Study of Punjab,” *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society (Historicus)*, vol. 71, no. 3 (2023): 71.



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